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Recent months* have seen a number of signs that a process of restructuring involving 
certain modifications to the racial division of labour and job colour bar regulations 
is currently underway in South Africa. In December 1977, for example, a number of 
statutory job reservation deteminations were scrapped by the Ivlinister of Labour. In 
June of this year an agreement between the Steel and Engineering Industries Federation 
(SEIFSA) and the wkite trade union bureaucracies abolished previous closed shop 
agreements which had the effect of barring Africans from certain grades of work; and 
similar agreements have also been entered into in other industries, notably fmznfture 
making. (1) But the most significant moves in this direction are expected to follow 
the publication of the report of the Wiehahn Commission of Inquiry into industrial 
legislation later this year,** llInformed messes1' suggest that the Commission will, in 
addition to recommending a strategy aiming at the incorporation of the African trade 
union movement into a bureaucratic and rigidly controlled "industrial relationsl1 
system, also recommend the repeal of all statutory "job reservatione1 legislation and 
the prohibition of closed shop agreements which have the effect of restricting certain 
places in the division of labour to members of particular racial groups. (2) Although 
these moves in no way foreshadow the final end of the job colour bar in South Africa 
(the alternative forms of llprotection of minority ri&tsn which the Commission will 
recommend will probably amount in practice to a more concealed and less comprehensive 
but none the less real job colour bar), lkey are impor.tant moves in the class struggle 
with potentially significant effects on the class structure asnd future trajectory of 
class S-1;xuggle. Furthemore, it is quite clear that this particular aspect of the 
restructuring of capitalist social relations in South Africa will fig~w? prominently 
in resurgent reformist ideologies directed both inside the country anrl abroad. The 
object of this paper is to analyse the factors underlying these particular moves at 
this time: to analyse and explain why the bourgeoisie should now be ellgaged in an 
offensive struggle to modify the racial division and job colour bar legislation, and 
to assess the likely effects of these moves on the class structure aYld future pattern 
of class relations. 
I do not intend to dipess into a lengthy account of the origins of the 
present racist hieraschical divisiou! of labour within the wage-earning classes of 
South Africa. It is sufficient for our present puqoses merely to note (i) that a 
social division of labour in which the "most seniorn mental, supervisory and skilled 
manual wage-earning places were occupied by whites (and in which whites were given 
preferential access to such places) was formed in the period circa 1850-1960, a d  
that (ii) during this period the formation and reproduction of such a division of 
labour broadly accorded both with the value and 'technical requirements of capitalist 
production and with the political interests of the bourgeoisie &/or particular 
bourgeois fractions. 
What is clear, and clearly behind current attempts at modification, however, 
is that the continued reproduction of such a racist hierarchical division of labour, 
at least in its present fom, no longer accords with the interests of the bourgeoisie, 
or indeed of any significant fraction thereof. There are a number of aspects to this. 
Firstly, it is clear that it no longer accords with the economic imperatives of capital 
accumulation in the South African social formation. To begin to understand this, we 
first have to understand that the extended reproduction of monopoly capitalist 
relations of production, whilst involving the progressive deskilling and increasing 
subordination of manual labour, on the one hand, also involves the creation of a 
minority of specialized supervisory and mental wage-earning places, on the other. 
This has been extensively discussed in the theore-tical literature (3) and space 
precludes any exfended elaboration here. But the essential points for our purposes 
are that in the South African case, in the period since the mid.-60s at least, the 
extended reproduetion of monopoly capitalist relations of production has proceeded at 
a rate in excess of the rate of gxowth of the white pop-txlation; and that under these 
conditions the totalitx of factors underlying the continued reproduction of the racist 
hierarchical social division of labour within the wage-earning classes (including, for 
exmple, such structural heritages from capitalfs past practices ss the racist 
education system, as well as job colour bar regulations and curent whiGe trad.e union 
lfpressures") have resulted in capitalists expe~iencing shortages of certain categories 
of mental, supervisory and. skilled manual laloow. power. 
These shortages have affected bokh the production and circulation processes. 
In production, they have appeared as shortages of technicians, sl~pemisors and 
artisans (the latter now predominantly involved in maintenance work rather than in 
actual production). (4) In circulation, tliey have appeared as shortages of clerical, 
administrative, sales and other staff engaged in the unproductive but necessary task 
of realizing surplus value. 
Recent years have seen a number of attempts from various bourgeois quarters 
to calculate the extent of these shortages. Generally these Pave fallen into one of 
three categories. First, there have been the assessments based on stated pl~awciesf'. 
This has been the method adopted in official statistics and the latest known figures 
of this sort (covering April 1977) show shortages of 99,000 (;.9%) continuing to 
exist in the "professional, semi-professional aYid technical grades1' despite the 
recession. (5) The second main method of ca,lculating the extent of these shortages 
has been to compare the proportion of the  economically activeu population of South 
Africa occupying places in the Professional and Tecbnical, Administrative and 
Ekecutive, Clerical and Sales categories (the International Stanard Classification 
of Occupations categories 0, 1, 2 and 3) with that in other countries. C+nerally9 
the comparison has been made with the position in the metropolitan social fomations 
of Western Europe and North America, thereby ignoring the place of the latter as the 
dominant social formations in the imperialist chain. (6) But, a sMlar, more valid 
comparison could also be made between the position in South Africa and that in a 
number of so-called middle level industrialized cow~tries in the periphery. Such a 
comparison is attempted in Table l, which shows that, whereas h 1960 SouYa Africa 
was rou&ly on a par with the norms established inintermational capitalist competition 
for the so-called middle level indmtrialized countries, by 1970 it had come to diverge 
quite markedly (having only 16.5% of its "economically active9' population in ISCO 
categories 0-3 compared to a norm, of about 18-200/0). Thirdly, there have been a number 
of attempts to estimate the future demand for various categories of "skilled" labour 
power assuming a certain rate of growth, and to compare this with the projected growth 
in the lleconomically active" white population. One calculation of this type (by 
J. A. Parsons, senior research officer of the Chamber of lvIines 671) has referred to a 
demand for 2,796,000 "white collarn employees by 1990 assuming a 5% rate of gmwth. 
Comparing this with an esthated 1,348,000 whites available to fill these places, this 
indicates a shortage of 1,448,000 unfilled "white collar" places unless they are turned 
over to persons of other races. Although all of these calculations do have defects, 
they do at least indicate in a general way: (a) that South African capitalism has 
been experiencing a shortage of certain categories of llskilledfs labour power since at 
least the mid-60s; (b) that these shortages have persisted despite the current 
recession (which, according to official estimates, has seen the total number of 
employers declining from 41,000 to 39,000 C81 ) ; and (c) that, given the continued 
reproduction of the racist hierarchical division of labour in its present form, they 
are likely to continue to persist into the Soreseeable future. 
However, to identify a shortage of particular categories of labour power is 
not necessarily to identify an imperative f o ~  a change in the social division of 
labour. It is class struggle and never the mere development of produc%ive forces which 
brings about changes in the reZations of production and social division of labour, and 
any class force seeking to effec-% a change in the s0cia.l division of labour 4aas 
therefore to weigh up the potential gains from (or necessity for) any such change 
against the risks inherent in %he process of class strqgXe necessary to bring it 
about. What has to be explained, then, in the South African case is why the 
bourgeoisie should have fomd it necessary Lo mount an offensive ~tmggle to modify 
the racist hierarchical division of Labour now, and. not in the hate 60s and 70s when 
the shortages of the various categories of labour power arising from the reproduction l 
of this division of labour were certainly clearly evident. What I w m t  to mgne here 
is that,under the conditions of overall expansion ad. increasing profitability which 
prevailed in the South African social formation during the 60s and. early 70a, the I 
potential adverse effects of these shortages on capital accumulation could in principle 
be ,and were in actual. practice being,sufficiently mitigated xithin -the co~text of the 
not to d e  it 
imperative for any major fraction of the buurgeoisie to risk enbarkfng upon such a 
process of class struggle, In other words, what will be argued is that the pressures 
arising from the "normal1' @owtl;l and development of the capitalist mode of production 
in South Africa could not be and were not on their OWE sufficient to produce a 
modification in the racist hierarchical character of the social division of labour, 
a d  that it was only under 'the pressuses of %he current economic er-isis and the recent 
struggles of the popular masses that such a, modification has becone imperative from , 
the bourgeois point of view. I 
l 
Apart from white immigration which had a limited. but real miti.gating effect 
on the shortages arising both in production and in circulation, there wexe two major 
w s  in which the potential adverse effects of these shofiages an capital s ~ e ~ a t i o n  
were mitigated during -the expansionary period of the 60s and 70s: firstly, in respect 
of the shortages arising in productiooxl, by the process described as "'floa-king the 
colour barff; and, secondl.y, in respect of the shortages arising in the circda%ion 
process, by the availability of large mounts of foreign investment capital. 
The process of lsfl.oating the colour barf1 has often enough been described 
not to need any extensive elaboration here. Basically, it was a process which 
accorded with the overall trend towards "deskilling" and mechanizing skilled production 
tasks, and it involved "buying out" the acceptance of white wage earners for +he 
fffragmentation'f, ffdilutionw or '~reclassificationfl of astisanal tasks previously 
performed by whites. Low paid black workers would. be bm@G in to perfom aewly 
mechanized manual functions in the labour process previouxly performed by whites. But 
at the same time previous white incumbents would be reassigned to other places 
lfhigher up1' in the hierarchy and wage increases =d other concessiom would be made ~ 
available to make the process acceptable to them a d  any other white wage em-ers I 
potentially affected. Of comse, it was m t  an ideal process from the standpoint of 
capital accumulation. It involved costs a d  delays. Btxt, as a number of researchers 
have pointed out (g), under the conditions of "boomif prevailing in the 60s and early 
7Os, it was, despite certain frictions with the regime and white tmae =ions, a 
process basically tolerable and acceptable to most capitalist inlerests, Under 
conditions of exparsion and increasing profitability, the costs of granting concessions 
to white wage earners were not a major burden on capital, and the process did allow at 
least the most pressing and imediate of the shortages of "skilledf' la.bour power to be 
met. Indeed, it was a pmcess which allowed a considerable degree of flexibility in 
respect of the rate and pace at which jobs were reclassified. For exmple, following 
a recommendation of the Reynders Connnission in 1972, a number of supplementary 
measures we= introduced by the state in order to accelerate the pace at which the 
"colom b a n  was ltfloated" (including mong other things a number of new retraining 
programmes for whites and other "incentivess1 designed to encourage white trade unions 
to agree to the reolassification of more '?whitev jobs at a faster rate). (10) 
In the case of the cixculation process, however, there was a very much less 
clearly evident process of "floating the colour bar". This can be explained to a 
large extent by the fact that the racial division of labour at this level was 
determined far less by the pressures of white trade unions or job colour bar 
regulations and f a r  m r e  by factors l ike  the s l m c t u . .  of the educatioinal system. 
What I want t o  suggest, however, i s  thaqt a t  t h i s  level,  too, the potential adverse 
effects  on capital  accumulation ar i s ing  froa shortages of certain categories of labour 
power were being m i t i p t e d  under the conditions of qt500mr" i n  th i s  case -hough by %he 
abundance of foreign investment capi tal  available i n  the social  formation a t  that  time. 
To establish th i s  point it is  necessary to  consider the role of the circulation process 
i n  the accumulation of capital.  Very brief ly,  following fhxx (111, the circulation 
process refers  to  two stages i n  the c i rcui t  movement of capital: to  the f i r s t  stage - 
where money capital  i s  exchanged f o r  labour power and the means of production (M - C:;'); 
and t o  the third stage where the comodities produced i n  the production process axe 
transformed into money capital  (C - M). However, although these two stages are 
necessary to the process of capi tal  a c c ~ m l a t i o n ,  it is  the second stage, the stage 
where labour power and the means of production are combined i n  the process of 
production, i n  which surplus value is  produced and on which, therefore, the process of 
capi tal  accumulation i s  ultimately Clependent. The time i n  which capital  i s  t i ed  up i n  
the process of circulation thus represents a time i n  which it i s  uazproductively 
employed: a time i n  which it is not being expanded through the addition of new surplus 
value. 
Now, if we assume that  the existence of a shor t fa l l  of labour power i n  the 
circulation process of a part icular  capi ta l i s t  social f o m t i o n ,  compared to the norms 
established i n  international capi ta l i s t  competition, means that  the circulation process 
of the social formation concerned functions with less  than average efficiency, then 
th i s  would imply that  capi tal  i n  that  social formation would tend t o  be t i ed  up f o r  a 
longer than average time i n  the circulation process. In  other words, a t  any one time 
a larger than average proportion of t o t a l  social capi tal  i n  the social foraation would 
tend to  be t i ed  up f o r  a longer than average time i n  processes i n  which it was not 
being expanded through the addition of new surplus value. 'gain, following Pkxrx- (12), 
t h i s  would tend to  have one of two possible effects  on capi ta l i s t  productfan i n  that  
social formation. Either it would require (i) the advaace of larger than average 
amounts of money capital  i n  order to  maintain production on the same scale or, i f  
larger  than average amounts of advanced money capital  were not availa,ble, ( i i )  there 
would have to  be a curtailment of production. Either way there would be a tendency 
towards a reduction i n  the r a t e  of prof i t  on advanced capital,  but i n  the f i r s t  case 
(case i above) the levels of production,and herice the rake of capi tal  accmulation, 
would be maintained. 
What I want tentatively to  suggest here is  tha t  th i s  f i r s t  case applied t o  
the South African social formation dmin~1; the "boom'"eriods of the 68s arad early 70s, 
I The large amounts of foreign capital  available f o r  investment i n  the South A f r i c a  
l 
social formation a t  the time enabled production levels to be mintained despite the 
fac t  that  shortages of certain categories of labour power i n  the circulation process 
I produced a tendency towards a longer than average t ine  of circulation. I n  other words, 
what is  being suggested is  that  the abundance of foreign investment capi tal  seeking a 
share i n  the profi ts  of the "super exploitation1' of black labour acted as  a counter 
I tendency to  potential res t r ic t ing  effects  on capilal. ist  produc-tion ad. hence capital  
accumulation inherent i n  the shortages of labour power i n  the circulation process. 
To summarize: what has been argued so f a r  i s  that  as  long as  the conditions 
of overall expansion and increasing prof i tab i l i ty  which characterized the South 
African social formation i n  the 60s and early 70s persisted, sufficient mitigating 
factors existed i n  respect of the shortages of ski l led manual and new pet* bourgeois 
labour power not t o  make it imperative e i ther  f o r  social capi tal  as a bfhole o r  f o r  
say major fraction of ca,pitai t o  seek to  effect  a ch- i n  the r ac i s t  hierarchical 
character of the social  division of labour. Nodifying the r ac ia l  division of labour 
i n  a way which allowed more of the shortages of "skilleds' laboar power t o  be f i l l e d  
by blacks m a y  have been a desirable 'Irefom" from the standpoint of some bourgeois 
in teres ts  (particularly from the standpoint of those cap i t a l i s t  fractions which 
benefited leas t  direct ly at the po l i t i ca l  level from the support of the white wage 
earning classes). But, under conditions where a t  leas t  the most immediate and 
serious of the potential adverse effects  on capital  accmulation were being mitigated, 
it was scarcely worth the r i sks  of engaging i n  class  struggle to  bring about a 
l'comprehensiveu solution t o  what was, under the circmstances, a f a i r l y  minor economic 
class  problem. Certainly, it i s  c lear  that i n  the arena of actual class  struggle even 
the most "liberalv tendencies within the bourgeoisie sought little more during the 
"boomw of the 60s and early 70s than a more favourable adjustment within the framework 
of the racist hierarchical division of labour. For exanple, a process of floating the 
colour bar (albeit at a faster rate than under then existing conditions) is cleaxly 
what is envisaged in the following two quotations from Oppenheimer and Relen Swman in 
1970 : 
Nor should it be thought that better jobs and better 
pay for the African majority would be bought at the 
expense of the European workers. On the contrary 
African advancement could cer%ainly make possible much 
more rapid advancement for the Europeans also ... We 
are in the position that we can maintain this system 
and allow the whole structure to float upwards so that 
everybody benefits. (13) (~p~enheimer) 
What was needed was a massive re-education of white 
workers so that they would see that employment of non- 
whites would lead to a greater demand for %heir own 
services. (14.) (~uzman) 
&om the mid-1970s onwards, however, it is clear that these conditions have 
changed abruptly. Unlike the 60s and early 70s the present period is no longer one 
of generally increasing profitability and relative "political stabilitye' but, on the 
contrary, a period of generally declining profitability m d  slpolitical unrestf1, and it 
is precisely these changes in conditions which have produced the imperatives for 
capital to seek a modification in the racial division of labour and the removal of 
job colour bar legislation. In the first place it is clear that the process of 
"floating the colour bar" is no longer the tolerable way of supplementing the shortages 
of "skilled*I labour power in production as it was previously. On the contrary, under 
conditions of crisis and diminished profitability, the costs and delays inherent in the 
process have become a najor burden which capital in its struggle to maintain and 
restore profitability is obliged to seek to reduce. As the vice-president of the K1 
put it in 1976, 
present policy was forcing employers to pay unrealistic 
and artificial premium wages, thereby increasing instead 
of reducing costs ... 
and this, under conditions then prevailing, he went on: 
was seriously affecting South Africa's capacity to 
compete on international markets. (15) 
Furthermore, in addition to these direct effects of the decline in 
profitability, there are also the indirect effects arising from -be diminished inflows 
of new foreign investment capital. South Africa no longer offers the premium rates of 
return on foreign capital of the 60s and early 70s (in 1976, for example, the return 
on US capital invested in countries like Nigeria a d  Libya exceeded that on US capital 
invested in South Africa (16), a3ld this, coupled with the increasingly evident 
political risks attached to capital investment in South Africa, has led to a marked 
reduction in the volume of new foreign investment capital flowing to South Africa. 
Reserve Bank figures show a reduction in the inflow of long-term foreign investment 
from R1,56l million in 1975/6 to F452 million in 1976/7, which, together with an 
actual net "outflow of short tern capital from the private sector9' of some R767 million 
in the same year,gave a total net outflow of some R121 million compared to a net inflow 
of R1,635 million in 1974/5. (17) And under these conditions the mitigating effects in 
respect of the shortages of labour power in the circulation process previously provided 
by the availability of large amounts of foreign investment capital no longer apply. 
The shortages arising in this regard hitherto cushioned amidst an abundance of foreign 
investment capital have accordingly become an increasingly urgent and visible class 
problem for social capital, confronting it with the very real prospect of a curtailment 
of capitalist production. As E. Leistner of the Africa Institute put it at a 
"business man! S conference" in 1976, 
... a white monopoly of highly skilled aYld responsible 
posts Ln business administration ... was no longer 
tenable. Members of other racial moups would have to 
- - 
move up into such positions 
were not to fall to ever lower levels. Research has 
shown that within 15 years at leas% 500,000 white 
clerical jobs would be vacant unless- otker races were 
trained to fill work gaps vital for iuldlustrial expansion. (18) 
But,more than that, the crisis of profitability has forced the capitalist 
class in South Africa to attempt to restructure capitalist production at a higher 
orgamic composition of capital. Alternative methods of increasing the exploitation 
of the working class - such as increasing the length of the working day, increasing 
the intensity of labour, or reducing the absolute level of wages - have in practice 
been ruled out as the major means of raising profitability mder the conditions 
existing in South Africa today. Q~ite simply, the greater d e ~ e e  of orgaulization and 
militancy displayed by the black working class in recent years has made any such 
direct assaults too rise for the dominant classes. If profitability is to be raised 
there is only one possible solution - to raise the productivity of socizl labour by 
raising the organic composition of capital, and this must necessarily involve the 
inescapable combination of further structural unemployment and the further 6eskilling 
and subordination of manual labour, on the one hand, and the creation of an increased 
number of specialized supervisory and mental places, on the other. In short, under 
the conditions of economic crisis and diminished profitability of the mid and late 7Os, 
not only have the effects of existing shortages of mental and supervisory labour power 
become a much more serious problem for social capital but the only solution available 
to its profitability problems must necessarily involve an increased demand for these 
categories of labour power. Modifying the racial division of labour in a way which 
allows more blacks to be drawn into such places has, accordingly, become for the 
capitalist class no longer merely a "desirable refom if only the risks of class 
struggle did not existn but rather a major imperative in the struggle to maintain and 
restore proTitability. 
However, although the effects of the ecdnomic crisis provide the mneral 
context within which the current attempts to modify tine racial division of labour have 
to be seen, they cannot on their own explain the specific measures now being proposed. 
As we indicated earlier, the crisis in the South African social formation i s  not just 
an economic crisis (a crisis of profitability for social capital). It is also quite 
critically a political am3 ideological crisis, a d  these aspects of the crisis have 
also been. crucial detednmts of the form being assumed by current proposals: more 
specifioally of the fact that they involve the formal repea,l of job colour bar 
legislation and the removal of overtly racist barriers to "upward social mobilityt1 
rather thm, say, an attempt merely to mdemine their effects in actual practice. 
The political and ideological dimensions of the current crisis are, of 
course, well known, The populas mass uprisings beginning in June 1976, altho* 
brutally suppressed, provided a particularly vivid indication of the inherent 
instability of political class relations in the South African social foxmation. Among 
other things the risings demonstrated the evident failure of the existillg i~istitutiom 
of "separate developmentf1 to produce a sufficiently sizeable and influential black 
supportive class for the bourgeoisie. Tbey indicated clearly that the existing 
polarization of all major class forces among the black population, including the most 
significant fractions of the black petty bourgeoisie, was towards the proletariat, 
and that this polarization of class deteranination had become matched by the adoption 
of class positions antagonistic not just to the regime and specific policies but to 
the bourgeoisie as a whole and the capitalist mode of production. As one somewhat 
bemused bourgeois class warrior observed in 1976: "There is a general tendency for 
young Africans to be anti-free enterpriseefl (19) Indeed, although there are important 
disagreemen-bs within the bourgeoisie about a number of aspects relating to the 
restructuring of political and class relations (and, in q y  view, severe limitations on 
the capacity of the power bloc as currently organized to produce political solutions 
capable of stabilizing political class relations under bourgeois hegemony), there is 
none the less widespread agreement within the bourgeoisie that one crucial priority 
in the struggle for "the maintenance of the free enterprise systeml1 and "the survival 
of everything lthey] hold dearf1 must be some form of restructuring which would allow 
the emergence of a significant "black middle classw committed to '?free enterprise 
values". (20) In this context, removing some of the more obvious at least of the 
various forms of discrimination and oppression affecting the black petty bowcgeoisie 
(including critically "job reservationw and overtly racist baxriers to "upward social 
mobilityn) has become a major political imperative for the bourgeoisie. 
Furthermore, removing such overtly racist "barrierst1 has becone a major 
element in the struggle by capital in South. Africa to restore the level of foreign 
capital inflows. The reduced inflows of foreign investment capital to which we 
referred earlier are quite clearly having increasingly- severe repercussions on 
capitalist production in South Africa. South Africa, as a subordinate social 
formation in the imperialist chain, is of course "n~l?mally~~ hi&ly dependent on 
foreign investment to finance capitalist production. (One recent estimate concluded 
that local sources of investment capital - including reinvestments by foreip owned 
subsidiaries - could at most fund a 3-46 growth rate.) (21) But in the current period, 
when capital in South Africa is attempting to restructure production on a more 
productive and profitable basis, new foreign investment has become even more critical. 
With South Africa unable to offer premium rates of return in the short run at least, 
attracting new foreign investment capital has become crucially dependent on persuading 
potential foreign investors that some of the more obvious at least of the factors 
underlying South Africa's political instability (including among other things "racial 
discrimination in employment1') are being modified. Indeed, creating conditions which 
will &e South Africa llmore attractive" to potential foreign capitalist investors has 
become one of the themes most often emphasized in the frequent demd.s by various 
bourgeois spokesmen for the repeal of "job reservation" legislation and the like. For 
example, in December 1976 Oppenheimer concluded a call for various llrefomsll a ong 
these lines as follows: 
Naay overseas investors now had the attitude that it 
(investment in South Africa - RD) was risky. This 
could be changed by making full use of the material 
and human resources of South Africa and creating a 
society fairer to all. (22) 
In November 1977 the President of the South African Foundation specified 
Employment policies incorporating broadly equal 
opportunities, equal p w  for equal work [and] proper 
training to raise productivity . . . 
as changes necessary in order to attract "foreign investors 1ih9 were holding back for 
fear of black unrestll. (23) 
Having analysed the major factors underlying the current moves to modify the 
racial division of labour in South Africa, we now have to turn to the second part of 
our analysis - to cm, assessment of the likely effects of these moves on future class 
relations in the social formation. There are two main aspects which will be considered 
here: firstly, the likely effects on the relationship between capital and the white 
wage earning classes, and, secondly, the likely effects on the class structure and on 
the African dominated classes. 
It is the first aspect,, the relationship between capital and the white wage 
earning classes, which is likely to be most immediately affected. After all, "job 
reservation" determinations and more particularly racially exclusive closed shop 
agreements have been an importat means of protecting the relatively privileged 
position of at least some strata of the white wage eaxning classes, and their removal 
can therefore be expected to lead to some heightening of the struggle between capital 
and white wage earners. This is unlikely, however, to arise from the publication of 
Commission reports or the passage of legislationger se. The repeal of "job 
reservationI1 legislation is not something which the state is suddenly imposing out 
of the blue. On the contrary, it has been preceded by a lengthy process of 
ideological class struggle during which the bourgeoisie has sought to win at least 
the passive acceptance of the "white labous movementu for such a move. This has been 
taking place in earnest at least since the latter half of 1976 (f- rom which time 
virtually all the major organisations representing bourgeois fractional class 
interests - including, for example, the AfrikanerhauLdelsinstitux~t - have been eomitted 
to a policy of actively seeking to end "job rese~ration". (24) It is clear that 
this ideological struggle has had a fair measure of success at least among the 
I bureaucracies of the white trade unions, including those in unions whose memberships 
l 
l are likely to be most directly affected by moves of this sort. For exaaple, although 
the Confederation of Labour dissociated itself from the conditional zlecommendation to 
scrap "job reservation" made to Wiehahn by the other trade anion federations (25), 
bureaucrats in some of its affiliated unions have, in more recent months, reportedly 1 become "resigned to seeing formal colour bar clauses gof1. (26) Indeed, partly 
reflecting the continued importance of the alliance between the bourgeois class forces 
I 
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represented by the governing party and certain sections of the white wage-earning 
l classes, and partly reflecting the fact that the bourgeois state exists as the factor 
of cohesion and locus of class struggle of a capitalist social formation and not as 
the mere instrument of the dominant classes, government ministers and other state 
officials have moved towards explicitly endorsing demands for the repeal of "job 
l 
reservation" legislation only when it has become clear that this process of 
ideological class struggle has advanced sufficiently. For example, it was only in 
l December 1977, after securing the acceptance of white trade unions for the withdrawal 
of 18 "job reservati~n'~ deteminations, that the Minister of Labour first pblicly 
nquestion[ed] . . . whether statutory job reservation was still the right mechanism for 
the protection of minority groupsf9. (27) Prior to the appointment of .the Wiehabn 
Commission in July 1977 at least, departmental officials continued to argue in such 
terms as: "The abolition of job reservation was unacceptable to *hitee and would 
lead to serious labour (28) 
Rather than resulting from the publication of Commission reports or %he 
passage of legislationper se, the heightening of the struggle between capital and 
white wage earners is likely to result from the attempt to implement changes in 
actual practice, and. the precise degree to which this struggle will be heightened 
will thus depend on the precise degree to which changes are implemented and the 
precise extort: to which the position of white wage earners is affected. A11 that can 
be said at this stage is that, since it is certain that at least some atteqts will be 
made to bring about real modifications to the racial division of labour, there are 
likely to be struggles in at least some industries. Certainly it is clear that there 
are a number of "disputesw concerning the racial allocation of particular places which 
have in effect been postponed until "after Wiehahnfl. For example, d o n s  in industries 
where the five remaining job reservation dete&nati.ons are in force (notably %he 
Mine Workers Union and the Building Workers union) have thus far steadfastly refused 
to agree to the employment of blacks in places covered by the detemimtions. (29) 
l 
1 It is extremely unlikely, however, that the heightening of these or any 
1 other specific economic struggles between capital and. white wage earners (e.g. over 
I wages) will produce any major changes in the f'undamental political polarization of the 
l white wage-earning classes towards the bourgeoisie. mere are a number of factors 
I underlying this polarization - including the new petty bourgeois class determination 
of most white wage earners, their incorporation into the representative structures of 
the bourgeois state, and the effects of the ideology of racism or "Afrikanerdom" - and, 
l to imagine that the removal of specific economic concessions will automatically produce changes in political polarization, would be crude economism. What may happen, though, 
is that they might produce a strain in political alliances and relations of support 
which may be of significance in future political class struggles. 
Turning now to the second aspect of our assessment - the likely effects of 
the repeal of "job reservation9f on the class structure and on the African dominated 
classes, again these will depend more on the outcome of struggles taking place after 
the passage of legislation than on the passage of legislation per se. What clearly 
will not be affected, at least directly, however, are the r"un&mental relations of 
capitalist exploitation to which the mass of the African working class is subjected. 
Neither, it is clear, will there be anything like an "Africanizationfl policy giving 
particular competitive advantages to blacks. What is being sought is to bring about 
an adjustment in the racial division of labour at a pasticldar level. more favourable 
to the requirements of capital accumulation, and the most likely outcome is therefore 
that there will, to some extent or other, be some blurring of the racist hierarchy at 
the skilled mmual working class m d  lower mental/supe~soq levels. Put mother 
wa;y (in the terminolog~ of liberal ideology of the lg30s), this aspect of %he 
restructuring of South African capitalism will probably lead to a situation in which 
the llvanguardll of the black population "overtakesn the urear~rd" of the &ite 
population. Of course, it can be expected that any such changes in the class 
structure will be hailed as opening major new opportmities for Africans to "progress" 
t h r o w  I1upward social mobility". But what proportions of the African population are 
actually likely to benefit economically from changes of this sort? An attempt at a 
calculation is made in Tables 2A and B, which show the numbers of Africans likely to 
occupy certain places in the wage earning new petty bourgeoisie in 1990 on different 
assumptions. The tables assume that the total number of places in the LSCO categories 
0, 1, 2 and 3 will grow to a figuse equivalent to 2009 of the total pro jected 
neconomically activew population by 1990. Although this is a figure which would only 
put South Africa roughly in line with the position of a number of "middle level1' 
industrialized capitalist countries in the mid-70s, it would represent a much more 
rapid rate of growth in respect of these places than that achieved between l960 and 
1970, and it is furthemore the kind of projection being made by various bourgeois 
economists (such as parsons) on the assumption of a 55% rate of ''econamic growth". It 
can therefore be regarded as a fairly wrealistic" (even, since it assumes a fair 
measure of lleconomic growth1', a fairly lqoptimistf c'') projection. 
Turning to the allocation of agents of different mcial groups to these 
places, in Table 2A it is assumed that these places are first filled. by 8000/0 of the 
projected white 'leconomically activeu population and. 3009 of the projected Coloured 
and Asian lleconomically active1' population before the residue are "made availablev1 to 
Africaals. The figure for whites in this table can be regarded as reasonably hi&. 
The proportion of the white "economically activess population employed in these 
categories in 1974 was 60%, and, given that a proportion of whites would certainly 
continue to fill some artisanal, technical and supervisory places in production, a 
figure of 8009 would represent a situation in which the capacity of white wage earners 
to ensure priority for themselves remained relatively strong. The figure for 
Colomds an3 Asians, however, is selected arbitrarily. The proportion of the 
Coloured aYld Asian "economically active9>opulation occupying places in these 
categories was approximately 21% in 1974 a d  a reasonanably plausible figure (3% by 
1990) is simply selected for convenience and kept constant in both tables. On. these 
assumptions, Table 2k shows that the numbers of Africans occupying places in these new 
petty bourgeois categories would by 1990 be 396,774 (3.8~9 of the projected 
weconomically activeu African popvla-tion ; this compared to some 195,766 (3.06% of the 
l'economically active1' African population 
Table 28, on the other hand, assumes that the number of whites occupying 
these places in 1990 would be equivalent to 6@/0 of the white D'eccon~mically active" 
population. This is the same proportion as in 1974, and since, as we have indicated 
above, no fraction of capital is seriously proposing an Africanization policy, this 
would represent (given the educational advantages, etc., of whites) a situation in 
which the influence of white wags earners was relatively weak. On these assumptions 
(and assuming that the proportion of Coloureds and Asians remains constant at 3@), 
the number of Africans occupying places in categories 0-3 would rise to 896,027 (8.777 
of the total  economically activeu African population). 
What these tables clearly demonstrate is the bankruptcy of the ideology of 
"African advancement" through upward social mobility. I1Upward social mobility" is, 
of course, a myth of bourgeois ideology in any capitalist social formation. A 
minority of relatively privileged categories of mental/supervisory wage earning 
employment can exist only if the large majority of the wage earning population 
produces surplus value at a hi& enough rate, and there exist in all capitalist social 
formations a number of barriers (both visible and invisible) which restrict the 
capacity of agents with origins in one class to enter another. (30) But, applied b 
Africans in the South African social formation, the ideology is plainly absurd. Even 
if we add a projection of the number of Africans likely to occupy "skilled and semi- 
skilled1' places in production (and we know that today a number of Africans perfornn 
highly skilled work in production under extreme coercive and exploitative relations 
of production), and if we assume further that the "elevationn Lo these places means 
an economic gain for all the agents concerned (by no me- necessarily the case l31]), 
the tables show that the potential gains Prom any such process of restmcturing would 
be limited even on the most "optimistic" assumptions to less thaa one-sixth of the 
total s~economically active" African po ulation of 1990, What is more, the very 
process by which the number of mental,,"kpervisory places was increased t h r o w  a rise 
in the average organic composition of capital would necessarily imply, as ind.icated 
earlier, the further deskilling and subordination of manual labour and a fur%-her 
increase in structural unemployment (already running at an estimated 22.4%). (32) 
Thus, even if the process produced economic gains for some strata of the African wage 
earning population, it would necessarily imply further losses for others. 
On the other hand, thou&,it is necessary to note that this aspect of the 
restructuring of capitalist social relations in South Africa could result in a 
substantial increase in the size of the African new petty bourgeoisie (a two and a 
half fold increase in the proportion of l'economically active1' Africans occupying places 
in certain categories by 1990 on our second set of assumptions). What effect this 
might have on the future course of the class struggle cannot be predicted with any 
certainty. There is no inevitability about the political polarization of the petty 
bourgeoisie. The petty bourgeoisie, as a non-fundamental class in a capitalist social 
fornation, may, depending on a number of factors and most particularly on the rhythm 
of the struggle between fundamental class forces, be polarized either towards the 
bourgeoisie or towards the proletariat, or more usually some fractions may be 
polarized one wa;y and others the other. It q y  be then that an enlargement of %he 
black petty bourgeoisie has little or no real effect on the class struggle in 
practice. But it may also be (and this is all that can be said at this stage) that 
it lays a firmer material. base for certain bourgeois class forces (particularly those 
not directly represented by the present governing party) to pursue strategies aimed at 
forming alliances with, and detaching from the popular masses, key sections of the 
African petty bourgeoisie. (333 
Conclusions 
The proposals emanating from Comissions like Wiehahn represent an attempt 
by the bourgeois state in South Africa to restmctme capitalist social relations in 
order to make more effective and more secure capitalist domination and capitalist 
exploitation under the change6 material conditions of production aazd vastly altered 
conditions of class struggle now characterizing the South African social formation. 
This is most clearly evident in the case of the proposals concerning African trades 
uniom where recognition within an apparently "non racial" industrial relations 
system will quite clearly mask new and more subtle means of exerting official control 
and repression over organizations of the African working class, (34) But it is also 
true, as the present paper has tried to show, of the proposals relating to the repeal 
of "job reservation1' legislation. Of course, in so far as "job msemration" 
legislation does represent a real aspect of the oppression of the masses of South 
Africa and in so far as mass popular struggles have been decisive in creating the 
conditions making its repeal necessary, it does represent a limited but real victory 
for the popular masses. But it is a victory which it is qdte certain the bourgeoisie 
will attempt to turn to its advantage. In the short run "the removal of the colour 
bar in industry1' will form part of a campaign aimed at restoring the level of foreign 
capital inflows, and in the longer run, as we indicated above, it= give rise to 
potentially more effective than hitherto "third forcev1 type strategies. What is 
certain is that this will call for new counter-strategies and tactics, both on the 
part of the popular class forces engaged in the struggle in South Africa and on the 
part of their1 supporters abroad. It is as a background to a discussion of such 
questions that the present paper is offered. 
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